Framework', in Stavrianarkis and Selby, eds., Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security, Theory, (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 20.
Vagts, the first historian of militarism, explains, this makes the antithesis of militarism not pacifism, but civilianism. 7 Militarism thus understood can be found to varying degrees in all modern societies, including China. The task for social scientific research is thus to explore how social relations are shaped through processes of militarization and de-militarization which are shaped by certain values. Herbert Spencer began to explore such values in the late nineteenth century, when he proposed that social dynamics are constrained to some degree by the existence of a 'militant' type of society. Within this, a high degree of regimentation is achieved by propagating values such as identifying goodness with bravery and strength, making revenge a sacred duty and cultivating a kind of patriotism that regards the triumph of one's own society as the supreme end of action. It is thus essentially authoritarian, creating a situation in which 'The habit of seeing everything officially controlled fosters the belief that official control is everywhere needed'. 8 Such a model does not disappear under modernization but continues to exist in varying degrees in a dynamic tension with an 'industrial' type that encourages the creativity and individualism required for industry to flourish.
To understand how this broader understanding of militarism might inform the China Model discourse, it is useful to use concepts that have been developed from work on other societies that arrived late to industrialization. Studies of Germany between 1870 and 1945, in particular, show how militarism can be used by the political elite to build coalitions with interest groups that are opposed to popular demands for political reforms. 9 Especially useful is the idea that it can be used as an important theme in the construction of a 'composite ideology' that has to be broad enough to appeal to powerful interest groups with wide ranging demands.10 Such literature is also useful for understanding the implications of militarism for lateindustrializing societies that are of sufficient size to pose a threat to the international balance of power. The International Relations theorist, Jack Snyder, for example, explains how political elites attempt to strengthen their legitimacy by deploying 'strategic myths' to build a composite ideology. Political actors in Germany and Japan thus felt no contradiction in portraying the United States and Britain as both existential threats and 'paper tigers'. Such strategic myths can have a powerful impact on international relations if they force decision-makers to make irrational foreign-policy decisions, as with Germany's aggression against Russia/the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour.
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There are good reasons to propose that such concepts can provide insights into the China Model. First, the basic dimensions of the Model have much in common with the understanding of militarism as a set of values and practices that are designed to to prevent liberal political change. It is clearly authoritarian and opposed to the principles of liberal-democracy: in the economic sphere the state controls land and large-scale financial and industrial enterprises, while using market mechanisms to allocate labor, goods and capital; government is conducted by officials appointed on merit and led by an 'advanced and altruistic' elite, which is only checked and balanced by competition among bureaucracies; political legitimacy is derived from a popular belief in hierarchical values based on the family structure and opposed to individualism. Because these hierarchical values integrate the loose social fabric of districts and work units into the government system there is no need and no space for the emergence of a separate civil society sphere. Such evidence is circumstantial however. To further substantiate the hypothesis that militarism needs to be included in any account of China's current politics, it is necessary to find evidence of a policy of propagating values and relationships that are clearly derived from military models. Such evidence should also show that this policy can be understood as part of a composite ideology that has political purposes beyond the fighting of wars. Moreover, it should show that this ideology includes 'strategic myths' that form a link between domestic politics and foreign policy. The policy of National Defense Education (NDE) is a good source for such evidence.
The Content of National Defense Education (NDE)
The National Defense Education Law (NDEL) (国防教育法) was passed in April 2001 and requires all citizens to undergo NDE from primary school onwards. It was drafted to codify an already existing set of policies in response to the call to 'rule by law' (依 following contents for NDE:
• Theory: Evolution of Chinese military theory from Marxism-Leninism through to Hu Jintao; defense policy and military strategy; defense construction; defense struggle -especially the theory of information warfare.
• Defense Knowledge: The national territory, adjacent seas and airspace; information warfare; high technology; defense economics; the armed forces; military leadership system; strength of national military power; the volunteer system and defense mobilization system.
• Defense History: The country's ancient, modern and contemporary military history, promoting patriotism, collectivism, and education in revolutionary heroism. Emphasis should be on the bloody struggles of the Chinese nation to achieve unification, independence and wealth and power; the role of the CCP in leading the whole people and the army in the revolution; stimulating patriotism by understanding the noble character and glorious deeds of revolutionary martyrs, national heroes and righteous individuals.
• Defense Situation and Responsibilities: Understanding the international and domestic situations to oppose splittism and to protect national unity; clarifying the challenging security environment; clarifying the responsibility for national defense construction and struggle, strengthening a crisis mentality among the citizens (增强公民的忧患意 识). 7: Combat skills.
8: Defense technology.
9: Stories of famous battles to illustrate the changeable conditions of combat.
10: A story from military history.
In order to understand how this curriculum is disseminated throughout society it is necessary to look at the institutional architecture that has been established for implementing NDE.
The Institutions of NDE
The NDE and NDML put in place a pyramid of institutions for policy development and 
The Role of Military and Paramilitary Institutions
The PLA and its associated paramilitary organizations are also important institutions for designing and implementing NDE. As stated above, the PLA plays a leading role by being involved in the drafting of the NDEL and the guidelines for NDE. to forget how economic development should be related to building a 'rich country and powerful army' (富国强兵).
Papers of the Third Workshop on National Normal and High School National
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The analogy with Sparta and the call to propagate a 'spirit of appreciating the military' (尚武精神) in the cause of building a 'rich and powerful country' also draws attention to the fact that NDE has its roots in a program to use militarism to promote modernization that has its origins in China long before the establishment of the PRC.
Present-day advocates of NDE themselves trace it to Chinese political activists who were active in Japan at the start of the twentieth century. 39 Best-known is Liang Qichao (梁启超), who set out to construct a Chinese version of the bushido spirit. quality of the whole people (全民素质).
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Strategic myths and foreign relations
Further insights into the political function of militarism within the PRC's composite ideology can be seen by looking at the way in which NDE is used to propagate a number of strategic myths about the international situation that are designed to stimulate a crisis mentality. This is most notable in a bellicose anti-Western tone, expressed when one writer on NDE for middle schools reminds his audience:
War is not far away, we cannot but examine anew our security environment and examine anew our national defense environment. Although our security environment has had a big improvement of late, let us not mince words that some Western countries, when it comes to such domestic problems as human rights, nationalities, economics and Taiwan, have produced plenty of articles and engaged in containing our country, with the aim to 'Westernize' and second-year students. 48 The first-year text book asserts that some 1,500,000 square kilometers of territory are illegally occupied because China 'at present lacks the necessary means of administration'. This claim is strengthened by the geostrategic argument that the occupation of the blue territory by other states presents an 47 Ibid., pp. 27-28. obstacle to China's development because it is located on the sea-lanes linking China with West Asia and Africa and is rich in natural resources.
The above strategic myths are finally brought together with the call for a strong military and the priority of economic development and national indignation as part of the project to shape national psychology. This is summed up by a paragraph in the conclusion of the chapter on the national territory, which states:
For these reasons, the occupation and development of the beautiful and abundant maritime territory by other people is something that definitely cannot be tolerated by the Chinese nation. In order to protect our country's legal maritime rights, protect our country's maritime territory, we must not only increase our strength for maritime national defense, it is even more important and pressing that we strengthen the consciousness of maritime territory and maritime development of the whole people, strengthen our country's comprehensive power for maritime exploration and development to build the large and powerful maritime economy of the Chinese nation. This is because militaristic themes can be appropriated by a wide range of actors. As
Oleg Benesch demonstrates in a ground-breaking analysis of the construction of the bushido tradition in Japan and its implications for China, these can range from fascists to internationalists.
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As in other societies, the shape of militarism in China will be defined how such actors respond to internal and external shocks. A particularly serious problem for using NDE in such situations is how to make militarism interesting for a rising generation. School children are unlikely to be interested in topics such as discussions of the influence of Advocates of NDE are unlikely to give up their cause in the face of generation change, however. Contributors to the 'Iron and Blood' on-line forum, for example, were incredulous that someone applying to be a civil servant could be ignorant of something that even a junior school student should know. 64 Yet Chinese commentators also recognize the need to make adaptations, such as reducing the role of the military and paramilitary in NDE to teaching military drill, leaving the rest of the curriculum in the hands of organizations concerned with tasks such as education and environmental protection. 65 It is even being suggested that cellphones can be used to disseminate NDE.
